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and Hawn. Indeed, Justice Stewart's discussion of the latter case is most
inadequate. Ironically, in another case decided the same day as Halecki,
Justice Stewart, again writing for the majority, held on a subsidiary point
that an employee of an independent contractor, engaged in repairing an
oil pump to facilitate the unloading of a cargo of oil, came within the scope
of the unseaworthiness doctrine. 40 The Justice believed that Hawn was
controlling. Although Justice Stewart has apparently been able to solve
the labyrinth of unseaworthiness, he has left the attorney with an ample
supply of confused authority for both limiting and expanding the Sieracki
doctrine.
MICHAEL C. SLor.TcC

DUE PROCESS-POST CONVICTION
SUPERVENING INSANITY HEARING
In conducting a proceeding to determine the present sanity of condemned petitioners, the prison warden refused to hear any testimony on
their behalf. The petitioners' mandamus petitions contended that his
refusal violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Held,
the California statute' permitting execution of allegedly insane murderer on
basis of the warden's unreviewable ex parte determination that prisoner is
sane does not offend due process. Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549
(1958).
The justifications for the common law rule against executing an
insane man, vary considerably. 2 This concept has been adopted in almost
every jurisdiction having capital punishment, 3 either through legislative

40. The M/V

"Tungus" v. Skovgaard, 79 Sup.Ct. 503, 508, n.9 (1959).

1. CAL. PEN CODE §§ 3700, 3701 (Supp. 1949), "[1if after his delivery to the
warden for execution, there is good reason to believe that a defendant tinder judgment
of death has become insane, the warden must call such fact to the attention of the
district attorney . . . whose duty it is immediately to file in superior court a petition,
stating . . . that the defendant is believed to be insane . . . thereupon the court must
at once cause to be summoned and impanneled . . . a jury of twelve persons to hear
such inquiry."
'2. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *396 (Blackstone considered the purpose of the
rile was to prevent the infliction of punishment upon a person so lacking in mental
capacity as to be unable to understand the nature and purpose of the punishment);
3 CoxF, INSTITOTES 6 (Lord Coke declared that it was not an example to others to
execute an insane man, in addition it would be extremely inhumane and cruel); HALE,
PLEAS OF TuE CROWN § 34 (Stokes and ligersol ed. 1847) (Lord lale reasoned that
if lie were of sound memory he might allege something to stay execution); II HOWELL,
ENCLISH STATE TRIALS 474, 477 (1685)
(Sir John flawles reasoned that an inability
to prepare for an afterlife was the basis for the rule.)
3. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 26 (1950) (appendix to dissenting opinion);
WEIFrOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER As A CRIMINAL DE':FENSF § 5, 463-470 (1954).
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enactment 4 or judicial decision. 5 It is doubtful whether the common law
has been translated into a substantive right under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, since the Court has never definitely established
such a right.6 The view as expressed by the majority in Solesbee v. Balkcom
appears to limit the principle to a status of privilege,s A contrary view
establishing the existence of a substantive right may be implied from the
dicta of the majority and concurring opinions in Phyle v. DuffyY The
analogy of post conviction rights to the privilege of reprieve in Solesbee,10
reflects the traditional attitude that the convict, once fairly tried and
proven guilty, may gain a reprieve only by way of executive clemency.11
Attempts to regulate state activities on the basis of a substantive right
under the due process clause in other situations involving post conviction
procedures have similarly failed.' 2

4.CAL. PEN. CODE § 1367 (Supp. 1949), "A person cannot be tried, adjudged
to punishment or punished for a public offense while insane."
5. See, e.g., Perkins v. Mayo, 92 So. 2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1957) (one cannot be
tried or executed while insane); accord, State ex rel Deeb v. Fabisinski, 111 Fla. 454,
152 So. 207 (1933); Ex partc Chesser, 93 Fla. 590, 112 So. 87 (1927).
6.E.g., in Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 11 (1950) the court stated "It is
suggested that the reasoning of the Georgia Supreme Court in this case requires us to
pass upon the state statute as though it had established a state practice designed to
execute persons while insane. But we shall not measure the statute by some possible
future ap lication."
7. Solesbee v. Balccom, supra note 6. The Court set aside the substantive issue
by tenuously construing the Georgia statute, GA. ConE ANNo. § 27-2602 (1936), as
being indicative of the existence of a humanitarian policy against executing the insane.
In validating the Georgia statutory procedure, the Court took the view that postponement of execution because of insanity had a close affinity not to trial for a crime but.
rather to reprieves of sentence in general, implying that a stay of execution is considered an act of grace. It may be contended that since both the majority and the dissent
felt it necessary to test the constitutionality of the procedures, a substantive right which
must be protected by procedural safeguards does exist.
8. This view was first expressed in Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 409 (1897).
"[Alt common law a suggestion . . . of insanity did not give rise to an absolute right
on the part of a convict Jo have such issue tried before the court and to a jury, but
addressed itself to the discretion of the judge, it follows that the .manner in which such
question should be determined was purely a matter of legislative regulation. It was
therefore a subject within the control of the State of Georgia."
9. 334 U.S. 431 (1948). Petitioner's contention of a denial of due process
because of an ex parte determination of his restoration to sanity was not considered by
the Court, the case being remanded for a further exhaustion of state remedies. However,
the Court strongly indicated that California must afford a condemned person a right to
demand and obtain a judicial determination as to his sanity based on state law, which
impliedly confers an absolute right protected by due process upon the condemned. See
CAL. PEN. CODE, note 4 supra. "Where life is at stake one cannot be too careful.
I's had better be dotted and t's crossed." Phyle v. Duffy, supra at 444 (concurring
opinion) Contra, Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal. App. 2d 144, 208 P. 2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1949)
(on remand, dissenting opinion contended hearings of this nature are a privilege).
10. Solesbee v. Balkeom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
11. Cf. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 99 (1928); Ex parte United States, 242
U.S. 27, 42, (1916); Ex prte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333,380 (1866); Ex Parte

Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 310 (1855).

12. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250-52 (1949) denial of opportunity
to be confronted by and cross-examine witnesses during a post conviction hearing to
determine sentence, isnot a violation of due process); Burns v. United States, 287 U.S.
216 (1932) (due process does not require opportunity to offer evidence at a parole
revocation hearing). See also Siipola v. Ness, 90 F. Supp. 18, 21 (N.D.Wash., 1950).
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The strong dissent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Solesbee'3 is the only
clear indication that a substantive due process right does exist. He contended that in determining minimum procedural safeguards, it is of paramount importance whether a substantive right exists. If none exists the
state may validly exercise its benevolence as a matter of grace. His conception of due process "embodies a system of rights based on moral
principles so deeply embedded in the traditions and feelings of out
people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived
by our whole history.' 4 Mr. Justice Frankfurter relied on the history of
the common law to show that the fourteenth amendment prohibits
execution of the insane and that the requirements of due process has not
been met by the state's procedure. However, historical criteria, although
relevant, have not been determinative in the Court's solution of other
fourteenth amendment problems.'
Two types of statutory procedures determining a condemned man's
sanity have been examined under the light of procedural due process by
the United States Supreme Court. They are; (1) where the sheriff or
warden notifies the court or district attorney and the proceeding is conducted by the court,' and (2) where the determination is made by the
governor. 7 A "full and adequate administrative and quasi judicial process...
created for the purpose of investigating the suggestion"' 8 of insanity is
sufficient. These administrative determinations by an "apt and special
tribunal"' 9 have been held not to violate procedural due process, even

13. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
14. Solesbee v. Balkcom, supra note 13; cf. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128,
142 (1953) (dissenting opinion); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Louisiana
ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466 (1947) (concurring opinion).
15. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (self incrimination privilege);
Walker v. Sauvinet, 9Z U.S. 90 (1885) (jury trial).
16. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 3700, 3901 (Supp. 1949); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 593 (1949); NEv. Comp. LAws § 11192.02 (Supp. 1949); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22
§ 1005 1951); Tsx. CODE CRIu. PRoc. ANN. art. 921 (Vernon, 1948).
17. ARIz. CODE ANm. § 44-2307 (Supp. 1951); FLA. SrAT. § 922.07 (1951) (has
not been construed by the Florida Supreme Court); the leading case on the issue is
Ex parte Chesser, 93 Fla. 590, 112 So. 87 (1927), an interpretation of the common
law; GA. CoDr § 27-2602 (1933); MASS. ANN. LAWS cli. 279, § 48 (Stpp. 1957)
[with the advice and consent of the council, its function being merely advisory, Juggins
v. Executive Council, 257 Mass. 386, 154 N.E. 72 (1926)]; Indiana has no statute,
but the power is in the governor by judicial decision. Diamond v. State, 195 Ind.
285, 145 N.E. 250 (1924).
18. Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 405 (1897). In so holding the Court relied
upon the common law as set forth in 4 BILACKSTONF., OP. cit. supra note 2, at 395-96,
to the effect that if a prisoner appears to be insane after conviction and before execrition the procedure to be followed would be left in the judges discretion, and also
cited at 407, Laros v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. 200, 210 (1877), where it was held
that a right to trial by jury to determine the question of sanity after conviction was
"inconsistent with the due administration of justice."
19. Solesbee v. Balkeom, 339 U.S. 9, 12 (1950), citing Nobles v. Georgia, 168
U.S. 398, 409 (1897).
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though they are ex parteY0 The state procedures vary, from the minority
of states21 applying the common law,2 2 to the majority of jurisdictions
which have enacted statutes giving the sheriff or warden authority to
institute proceedings.25 Statutory provisions considered nonexclusive have
been held not to deprive the court of its common law power to grant
relief if incompetency is brought to its attention in some way other than
that proscribed by statute.2 4 Even where the provisions are considered
exclusive, it has been held that the court has the power to review the
25
official's refusal to act.
In the instant case, based on the authority of Solesbee v. Balkcom, 2
the Court in a per curiam opinion held valid the warden's ex parte
determination of whether there was good reason to believe the condemned
man insane. There has been speculation that if a substantive right served
as the basis for the Court's decision, it was defined in terms of customarily
afforded procedures.27 In California these procedures only entitle the condemned person to the exercise of an administrative official's discretionary
judgment on the issue of insanity. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, assumed
the existence of a substantive limitation in concluding that the warden's
20. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950), upholding the Georgia act, which
empowers the governor to determine the issue upon a report by experts, but without
necessarily hearing any evidence offered by the condemned. The holding severely
weakened the contrary implications of Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U-S. 431 (1948), note 9
supra, marking a return to the doctrine of Nobles v. Georgia, 168. U.S. 398 (1897),
note 8 supra.
21. In twelve states there are no statutes outlining the procedure to be followed
when a defendant under sentence of death appears or is alleged to be insane. Delaware,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Tennessee,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington and West Virginia.
22. Most of these states follow the general common law rule, that if a reasonable doubt is raised in the mind of the trial court of the sanity of a person whom it
has sentenced to death, the court, in order to prevent the execution of an insane person
may order an inquiry on the matter, and suspend execution if the defendant is found
to be insane. See Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 (1897); Ex parte Chesser, 93
Fla. 291, 111 So. 720 (1927); In re Smith, 25 N.M. 48, 176 Pac. 819 (1918); State
v. Bethune, 88 S.C. 401, 71 S.E. 29 (1911); Grossi v. Long, 136 Wash. 133, 238
Pac 983 (1925).
23. See statutes cited note 16 su/pra.
24. Lewis v.State, 155 Miss. 810, 125 So. 419 (1930); Barker v.State, 75 Neb.
289, 103 N.W. 1134 (1905); contra, Howell v. Kincannon, 181 Ark. 58, 24 S.W. 2d

953 (1930).

25. Shank v. Todhunter, 189 Ark. 881, 75 S.W. 2d 382 (1934); Howell v. Todhunter, 181 Ark. 250, 25 S.W. 2d 21 (1930);cf. McCracken v. Teets, 41 Cal. App.
2d 648, 262 P. 2d 561 (1953). Contra, "Both the Nobles and Phyle cases stand for
the universal common-law principle that upon a suggestion of insanity after sentence,
the tribunal charged with responsibility must be vested with broad discretion in deciding
whether evidence shall be heard.
This discretion has usually been held nonreviewable
by appellate courts.4 " Solebee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 13 (1950) (n. 4, "See cases
collected in Notes, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 424 et seq.; 49 A.L.R. 801 et seq.; 31 L.R.A.
577 et. seq."
26. 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
27. Review, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARV. L. REv. 181, 182 (1958).
Another possibility considered was that although the common law rule has been uniformly adopted by the states itdoes not reflect a currently held moral attitude; or that,
despite the attitudes existence, it was insufficient to justify a constitutionally protected
right.
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refusal did not violate procedural due process. He placed great reliance
on the warden's good faith determination 2 and the possible delays that
might result from an adversary proceeding. On the other hand, Justice
Frankfurter, dissenting, maintained that due process requires some procedure to assure that the warden "hear the other side"29 although there
need not be a formal adversary hearing before him.
In applying the decision in Solesbee v. Balkcomn3

to the instant case,

the Court firmly re-established its initial view 8' on post conviction procedures, by extending it to a procedure authorizing the warden to make an
cx parte determination of supervening sanity. The query of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, "What kind of constitutional right is it, especially if life is at
stake, the vindication of which rests wholly in the hands of an administrative official whose actions cannot be inquired into, and who need not
consider the claims of the person most vitally affected, the person in
whom the constitutional right is said to inhere?" 3 2 goes directly to the
substantive origin of the procedural requirements of due process.
It appears by implication from the present decision that whatever
the right under the due process clause, its protective forcefulness as a
limitation upon state activity, is almost non-existent. The standards set
by the minimum procedures upheld in the case, conceivably can be met by
almost any state procedure, no matter how arbitrary, so long as it is carried
out in good faith by a responsible official. An affirmative adjudication of
the substantive issue, which would require minimum procedural safeguards,
seems quite unlikely at the present time.
MARK

W.

KAY

INSURANCE-SEPARATION AGREEMENTRELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS
The beneficiary of a life insurance policy, prior to divorce, released all
her claims against the insured in a separation agreement. The insured busband subsequently died without having changed the beneficiary in his life
insurance policies.

In a suit contesting the beneficiary's right to the pro-

28. Contra, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S.
9, 25 (1950), argued that it was not a question of good faith. "The fact that a
conclusion is reached in good conscience is no proof of its reliability. The validity

of the conclusion depends largely upon the mode by which it was reached."

29. Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549,
(1958) (dissenting opinion).
"The right to be heard somehow by someone before a claim is denied, particularly if
life hangs in the balance, is far greater in importance to society, in the light of the
sad history of its denial, than inconvenience in the execution of the law."
30. 339 U.S. 9 (1950). See notes 6, 20 sutra.
31. The initial view was set forth in Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 (1897),
where it was held that it is within the discretion of the state to determine the nature
of post conviction hearing procedures. See also notes 8, 18 supra.
32. Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958).

